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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC

SUBJ: DRAFT NPG PERMREPS REPORT ON THE STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S
INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. MISSION PROVIDED (IN PARA 3 BELOW) THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT NPG
PERMREPS REPORT ON THE STUDY ON COMMUNICATING INTENTION
TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPG/WP(74)7) AND (IN PARA 2 BELOW) THE
TEXT OF THE SYG'S COVER NOTE TO WHICH THE REPORT IS ATTACHED.
MISSION RECOMMENDS THAT WASHINGTON APPROVE THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT.
ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON GUIDANCE BY OCTOBER 7, 1974.

2. TEXT OF SYG'S COVER NOTE. BEGIN TEXT

AT THEIR MEETING IN ANKARA IN MAY, 1974, THE NPG MINISTERS
INVITED(1) THE NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO INITIATE A STUDY ON
THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS TO AN ENEMY, TO
OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC, AND ON RELATED PROCEDURAL MATTERS
IN RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST, A STUDY(2) WAS PREPARED BY THE NPG
STAFF GROUP.

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2. TO FACILITATE CONSIDERATION OF THIS STUDY BY THE NPG
MINISTERS AT THEIR MEETING IN ROME ON 7TH AND 8TH NOVEMBER, 1974 IT
IS INTENDED THAT THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES SUBMIT A REPORT OUT-
LINING SOME POSSIBLE AREAS FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION. ATTACHED

IS A DRAFT OF SUCH A REPORT PREPARED BY THE NPG STAFF GROUP.

3. DELEGATIONS ARE REQUESTED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR NATIONAL AUTHORITIES SO THAT THE NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONSIDER THE DRAFT AT THEIR MEETING ON 10TH OCTOBER, WITH A VIEW TO PRODUCING A FINAL VERSION TO BE CIRCULATED AS A MINISTERIAL AGENDA DOCUMENT IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. END TEXT.

3. TEXT OF DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT. BEGIN TEXT

I. PURPOSE

1. THIS REPORT IDENTIFIES SOME POSSIBLE AREAS FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THE STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS(1).

II. BACKGROUND

2. AT THEIR MEETING IN ANKARA IN MAY, 1973, THE NPG MINISTERS CONSIDERED A REPORT(2) CONTAINING SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE NUCLEAR CONSULTATION ASPECTS OF WINTEX 73, AND A REPORT(3) COMMENTING ON AN ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY ON DEMONSTRATIVE USE (4)N BOTH OF WHICH COMMENTED ON THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR DISCUSSION, THE MINISTERS INVITED(5) THE NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO INITIATE A STUDY ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS TO AN ENEMY, TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC, AND ON RELATED PROCEDURAL MATTERS.

(1) NPG/STUDY/46, 20TH SEPTEMBER, 1974. HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE CNI STUDY. AS IN THE STUDY ITSELF, THE ABBREVIATION CNI IS USED IN THIS REPORT TO REPLACE THE PHRASE "COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION."

(2) NPG/D(73)3, 17TH APRIL, 1973

(3) NPG/D(73)4, 17 TH APRIL, 1973

(4) NPG/STUDY(71)4, 11TH MARCH, 1971, ENCLOSURE 2

(5) NPG/D(73)7, 21ST MAY, 1973, PARAGRAPH 16

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3. A STUDY ON THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE NPG STAFF GROUP, COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING

IN NPG ACTIVITIES. PERSONNEL FROM THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF, SHAPE AND SACLANT ALSO CONTRIBUTED.

4. THE CNI STUDY DEALS PRIMARILY WITH A QUESTION THAT WOULD CONFRONT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES IN TIME OF HOSTILITIES IF THEY SHOULD BE CONSULTING ON REQUESTS OR PROPOSALS FOR NATO USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IN ITS DEFENCE, NAMELY, WHETHER TO MAKE A COMMUNICATION EFFORT(1) IN PARALLEL WITH THE USE ITSELF IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THE NATURE OF, AND REASONS FOR, THAT PARTICULAR USE. THE STUDY ALSO LOOKS AT THE QUESTION OF HOW TO CARRY OUT A CNI ACTION IF A DECISION IS REACHED TO

DO SO. TOWARD THESE ENDS, IT IDENTIFIES AND EXAMINES THE PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE FACTORS THAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN NATO WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN DEALING WITH CNI QUESTIONS, AND DISCUSSES SOME PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF HANDLING THE MATTER. ALTHOUGH THE DPC GUIDANCE IN THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFESIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO(2)N USED AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE IN THE CNI STUDY, DEALS ONLY WITH SELECTIVE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT, WE AGREE WITH THE OBSERVATION IN THE CNI STUDY(3)

THAT NATO WOULD HAVE TO GIVE CONSIDERATION, TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING, TO QUESTIONS OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION WHENEVER ANY NUCLEAR WEAPON USE COVERED BY THE GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR OUR OPINION, THE CNI STUDY MAKES A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TOWARD LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE NUCLEAR CONSULTATION PROCESS.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE MINISTERS MAY WISH TO DRAW ON THE SEVERAL POSSIBLE AREAS FOR DISCUSSION SET OUT IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS. THIS LISTING IS NOT INTENDED TO BE EXHAUSTIVE OR RESTRICTIVE, OR TO PRECLUDE THE MINISTERS FROM RAISING OTHER POINTS THEY MAY WISH TO DISCUSS.

III. POSSIBLE AREAS FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION

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ROLE OF A CNI ACTION

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6. THE CNI STUDY POINTS OUT(5) THAT CNI MESSAGES HAVE AS A PRIMARY PURPOSE THE CLARIFICATION OF THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF NATO'S USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SO AS TO CONTRIBUTE TO CONTROLLING ESCALATION AND ABOVE ALL TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END. THIS IS CLEARLY RECOGNISED IN THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES(6) AND, IN MORE GENERAL TERMS, IS NOTED IN OUR REPORT(7) ON THE STUDY ON WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS(8). SINCE A CNI ACTION, IN THE SENSE THAT

(1) A CNI ACTION WOULD ENCOMPASS ALL THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO COMMUNICATE NATO'S INTENTION IN REFERENCE TO A SPECIFIC USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE MESSAGE OR MESSAGES THEMSELVES.

(2) DPC/D(69)58(REVISED), 10TH DECEMBER, 1970. HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES.

(3) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 9

(4) DPC/D(69)59, 20TH NOVEMBER, 1969

(5) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 18

(6) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPH 38

(7) DPC/D(74)18, 5AUGUST, 1974, PARAGRAPH 7

(8) ANNEX TO DPC/D(74)18

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THE TERM IS USED IN THE CNI STUDY, IS DIRECTLY LINKED WITH A PARTICULAR

OCCASION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON USE, IT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE OBJECTIVE OF THAT USE. BY THE SAME TOKEN, A CNI ACTION SHOULD NOT UNDERCUT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE USE WITH WHICH IT IS ASSOCIATED. AS NOTED IN THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE THREAT OF FURTHER ESCALATION

IS TO INDUCE THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW(1).

7. THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FURTHER EMPHASISE THE NEED TO CONTROL ESCALATION(2). ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY ALSO RECOGNISE THAT THE THREAT OF FURTHER ESCALATION BY NATO COULD BE AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT IN INDUCING THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION NATO WANTS HIM TO REACH(3). WE THINK THAT IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THE MESSAGE TO THE ENEMY THAT IS INHERENT IN THE PARTICULAR USE ITSELF WOULD CLEARLY CONVEY NATO'S INTENTION WITH RESPECT TO THESE TWO BASIC POINTS. WHILE THE ACTUAL USE MIGHT BE OBSERVED BY THE ENEMY TO BE LIMITED IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER (FOR EXAMPLE, IN TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT OPTION, NUMBERS OF WARHEADS USED, KIND OF TARGETS ATTACKED,

DURATION OF USE), THIS FACTOR ALONE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE TAKEN BY HIM AS A VALID INDICATION OF NATO'S DELIBERATE DECISION TO IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON ITSELF. SIMILARLY, ALTHOUGH THE ACTUAL USE IS INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE OF NATO'S RESOLVE TO DEFEND ITSELF WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THAT PARTICULAR SITUATION(4), IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE READ BY THE ENEMY AS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT NATO WAS PREPARED TO ESCALATE FURTHER.

8. AS BOTH THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES(5) AND THE CNI STUDY(6) POINT OUT, A CNI ACTION WITH ITS ELEMENTS OF EXPLANATION AND OF WARNING COULD CONTRIBUTE TOWARD REMOVING THESE AMBIGUITIES, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY ALSO HAVE POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISADVANTAGES(7). WE CONCUR WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN THE CNI STUDY(8) THAT A DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT NATO SHOULD TAKE A CNI ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH A PARTICULAR USE WOULD BE BASED ON AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF A MIX OF CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE CONFLICTING, AND DIFFICULT TO WEIGHT. WE ALSO NOTE THAT A CNI ACTION SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS AN SECRET

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ISOLATED STEP, BUT AS PART OF A CONTINUING SERIES OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIONS, DESIGNED TO INDUCE THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW, THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN MOTION FROM THE START OF THE AGGRESSION. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE AGREE WITH THE CNI STUDY(9) THAT THE CONTENT OF A CNI ACTION SHOULD BE IN HARMONY WITH OTHER PRECEDING AND CONCURRENT NATO ACTIONS SO AS TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREDIBILITY.

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- (1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPH 21
(2) SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPHS 23-27, 36-38, 49, 52, 59, 70, 95, 96
(3) SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPHS 1, 3, 21, 28, 38, 50, 53, 57, 95
(4) SEE ALSO CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 17
(5) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPHS 39-42-47, 95
(6) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 18
(7) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPHS 39, 40; CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 14
(8) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 25
(9) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 15

COMMUNICATING TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND THE PUBLIC
9. WHILE WE AGREE WITH THE THRUST OF THE CNI STUDY(1) THAT CNI MESSAGES SHOULD GENERALLY BE TAILORED TO FIT DIFFERENT AUDIENCES, I.E., THE ENEMY, OTHER COUNTRIES AND THE PUBLIC, WE STRESS THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT ALL OF THE CNI MESSAGES PERTAINING TO A PARTICULAR USE DO NOT CONTAIN CONFLICTING OR AMBIGUOUS EXPLANATIONS OF NATO'S INTENTION. THIS IS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF ENEMY MISINTERPRETATION, BECAUSE IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE ENEMY WOULD OBTAIN KNOWLEDGE OF CNI MESSAGES ADDRESSED TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC. AS A RELATED COMMENT, WE NOTE THAT THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATING IN TIME OF TENSION AND HOSTILITIES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND THE PUBLIC, NOT ONLY IN RELATION TO CNI ACTIONS, MIGHT BE A SUBJECT WORTHY OF STUDY ON ITS OWN IN A BROADER POLITICAL CONTEXT.

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TIMING OF CNI ACTION

10. THE OBSERVATIONS IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS CONFIRM THE CONCLUSION IN THE CNI STUDY(2) THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT NATO SHOULD TAKE A CNI ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH A SPECIFIC USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTING A CNI ACTION, CAN NOT BE FULLY ADDRESSED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION THAT EXISTS AT THE TIME THE DECISION TO IMPLEMENT SUCH USE IS MADE. THE MESSAGE ITSELF COULD BE TRANSMITTED BEFORE, DURING OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE USE IN QUESTION.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

11. IN DEALING WITH THE MILITARY ASPECTS, THE CNI STUDY RECOGNISES(3) THAT CNI ACTIONZ COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TACTICAL SURPRISE. HOWEVER, THE STUDY ALSO NOTES(4) THAT, UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, FAILURE TO TAKE A CNI ACTION COULD LEAD TO MILITARY CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD BE MORE DISADVANTAGEOUS THAN THOSE STEMMING FROM A LOSS OF TACTICAL SURPRISE. WE AGREE WITH THE STUDY CONCLUSION

THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE LOSS OF TACTICAL SURPRISE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY EVALUATED AT THE TIME THE NEED ARISES AGAINST THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF A CNI ACTION IN MINIMISING THE RISK OF ESCALATION BY THE

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ENEMY.

12. IN POINTING OUT THE NECESSITY FOR CLOSE CONTACT BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES DURING ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON CNI QUESTIONS, THE STUDY RECOGNISES THAT PROVISIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE FOR A MAJOR NATO COMMANDER TO INCLUDE IN HIS RELEASE REQUEST THE MILITARY OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, TO ANNOUNCEMENTS BY POLITICAL AUTHORITIES

ON NATO'S INTENDED USE(5). DURING NATO EXERCISES IN THE PAST THE

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- (1) SEE, FOR EXAVPLE, CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 28
 - (2) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 25
 - (3) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 21
 - (4) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPHS 21-22
 - (5) CNI STUDY, ANNEX, PARAGRAPH 6

MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS HAVE REFELCTED THIS PROVISION IN THEIR RELEASE REQUESTS BY A GENERAL STATEMENT THAT THERE ARE NO MILITARY OBJECTIONS TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. WE NOTE IN THIS CONTEXT THAT A CNI MESSAGE TO AN ENEMY SHOULD NOT BE SO VAGUE AS TO PROVOKE THE ENEMY OVER-REACTION THAT THE MESSAGE SEEKS TO FORESTALL.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

13. IN AGREEMENT WITH THE STUDY(1), WE EMPHASISE THAT THE PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTING WITHIN NATO ON CNI QUESTIONS SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR CONSULTATION PROCEDURES(2) AND HAVE THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS OF SIMPLICITY, FLEXIBILITY AND CAPABILITY TO ADAPT TO PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE CNI STUDY'S OBSERVATION THAT THE PROCESS OF REACHING DECISIONS

ON CNI QUESTIONS SHOULD BE VIEWED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LARGER PROCESS OF CONSULTING ON PROPOSALS OR REQUESTS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPON USE(3) AND THAT THE COUNCIL/DPC SHOULD BE THE NORMAL FORUM FOR CONSULTATION ON THIS SUBJECT(4).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

14. NOTING THAT SPECIFIC DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO CNI ACTIONS CAN ONLY BE TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT EXIST AT THE
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TIME THAT NUCLEAR WEAPON USE IS UNDER CONSIDERATION, WE AGREE WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN THE CNI STUDY THAT IT IS NEVERTHELESS ESSENTIAL THAT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES FAMILIARISE THEMSELVES NOW TIH THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL FACTORS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DEALING WITH THE CNI QUESTION IN TIME OF HOSTILITIES(5). IN THIS REGARD, HOWEVER, WE NOTE THAT THE STUDY HAS NOT ATTEMPTED TO EXAMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO DEVELOP A SET OF PRCEDURES TO ASSIST CNI CONSULTATION. FURTHERMORE, AS THE CENTRAL THEME OF THE STUDY WAS TO EXPLAIN THE USE AND TO WARN OF THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER USE, IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A WARNING MESSAGE SHOULD BE SENT PRIOR TO THE NUCLEAR USE DECISION, NOR WHETHER SUCH A MESSAGE MIGHT BE SENT AFTER A DECISION BUT PRIOR TO ACTUAL USE. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH QUESTIONS MERIT FURTHER CONSIDERATION IN THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP WHICH MIGHT HIGHLIGHT OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CNI PROBLEM WHICH, IN ADDITION TO THE PRESENT STUDY, MIGHT ALSO BE OF INTEREST TO THE DPC.

- (1) CNI STUDY, ANNEX, PARAGRAPH 3
- (2) DPC/D(69)59, PARAGRAPHS II.3 AND III.2
- (3) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 13; ANNEX, PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5
- (4) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 4
- (5) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 38

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

15. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE MINISTERS:

- (A) TAKE NOTE OF THE CNI STUDY;
- (B) DISCUSS THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE CNI STUDY AND
IN PART III OF THIS REPORT;
- (C) AGREE THAT THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD
CONSIDER FURTHER SUCH QUESTIONS AS ARE IDENTIFIED
IN PARAGRAPH 14 ABOVE. END TEXTMCAULIFFE

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